Christian History Institute Presents Pastwords #111: A Case for Political Absolutism by Sir Robert Filmer ©2007

FILMER, SIR ROBERT (c. 1588-1653) was squire of East Sutton, near Maidstone, Kent. Educated at Trinity College, Cambridge, and at Lincoln's Inn, he had a wide acquaintance with notable contemporaries, including William Camden and Sir Henry Spelman, the poet George Herbert, and possibly John Donne, and the royalist High-Church canon of Westminster, Peter Heylynwhom he met while he lived in the old porter's lodge of Westminster Abbey. Filmer was knighted by Charles I and had a brother and a son at court. During the Civil War his house was sacked, and he went to prison as a royalist although he never fought for the king.

Filmer's political tracts (first published between 1648 and 1653) were reissued in 1679 and his major work, Patriarcha published in 1680. John Locke said of Filmer's political works: "There was never so much glib nonsense put together in well-sounding English." Locke's writings on politics were directed against Filmer, which is Filmer's principle historical importance. He was the first English absolutist, for Patriarcha was written long before the Civil War and before Thomas Hobbs was published. Filmer, and the Kentish gentlemen who read him in manuscript, rejected government by consent well before parliament revolted against Charles.

Filmer believed that the state was a family, that the first king was a father and that submission to patriarchal authority was the key to political obligation. Notes adapted from Encyclopedia Britannica.

f any desire the direction of the New Testament, he may find our Saviour limiting and distinguishing Royal Power, By giving to Caesar those things that were Caesar's, and to God those things that were God's. Obediendum est in quibus mandatum Dei non impeditur. We must obey where the Commandment of God is not hindred; there is no other Law but God's Law to hinder our Obedience. It was the Answer of a Christian to the Emperour, We only worship God, in other things we gladly serve you. And it seems Tertullian thought whatsoever was not God's was the Emperours, when he saith, Bene opposuit Caesaripecuniam, te ipsum Deo, alioqui quid erit Dei, si omnia Caesaris. Our Saviour hath well apportioned our Money for Caesar, and our selves for God, for otherwise what shall God's share be, if all be Caesar's. The Fathers mention no Reservation of any Power to the Laws of the Land, or to the People. S. Ambrose, in his Apologie for David, expressly saith, He was a King, and therefore bound to no Laws, because Kings are free from the Bonds of any Fault. S. Augustine also resolves, Imperator non est Subjectus Legibus, qui habet in potestate alias Leges ferre. The Emperour is not subject to Laws, who hath Power to make other Laws. For indeed, it is the Rule of Solomon, that We must keep the King's Commandment, and not to say, What dost Thou? because Where the Word of a King is, there is Power, and All that he pleaseth, he will do.

If any mislike this Divinity in England, let him but hearken to Bracton, Chief Justice in Henry the Third's days, which was since the Institution of Parliaments, his words are, speaking of the King, Omnes sub Eo, & Ipse sub nullo, nosi tantum sub Deo, &c. All are under him and he under none, but God only: If he offend, since no Writ can go against him, their Remedy is by Petitioning him to amend his Fault, which if he shall not do, it will be Punishment sufficient for him to expect God as a Revenger: Let none presume to Search into his Deeds, much less to Oppose them.

When the Jews asked our Blessed Saviour, whether they should pay Tribute? he did not first demand what the Law of the Land was, or whether there was any Statute against it, nor enquired whether the Tribute were given by Consent of the people, nor advised them to stay their payment till they should grant it; he did no more but look upon the Superscription, and concluded, This Image you say is Caesar's, therefore give it to Caesar. Nor must it here be said, that Christ taught this Lesson only to the conquered Jews, for in this he gave direction for all Nations, who are bound as much in Obedience to their Lawful Kings, as to any Conquerour or Usurper whatsoever.

Whereas being subject to the Higher Powers, some have strained these words to signifie the Laws of the Land, or else to mean the Highest Power, as well Aristocratical and Democratical, as Regal: It seems S. Paul looked for such Interpretation, and therefore thought fit to be his own Expositor, and to let it be known, that by Power he understood a Monarch that carryed a Sword: Wilt thou not be afraid of the Power? that is, the Ruler that carryeth the Sword, for he is the Minister of God to thee-----for he beareth not the Sword in vain. It is not the Law that is the Minister of God, or that carries the Sword, but the Ruler or Magistrate; so they that say the Law governs the Kingdom, may as well say that the Carpenters Rule builds an House, and not the Carpenter; for the Law is but the Rule or Instrument of the Ruler. And S. Paul concludes; for this cause pay you tribute also, for they are Gods Ministers attending continually upon this very thing. Render therefore Tribute to whom Tribute is due, Custom to whom Custom. He doth not say, give as a gift to Gods Minister. But apodote, Render or Restore Tribute, as a due. Also St. Peter doth most clearly expound this place of St. Paul, where he saith, Submit your selves to every Ordinance of Man, for the Lords sake, whether it be to the King as Supreme, or unto Governours, as unto them that are sent by him. Here the very self same Word (Supreme, or uperecesais) which St. Paul coupleth with Power, St. Peter conjoineth with the King, basileis ws upereconti, thereby to manifest that King and Power are both one. Also St. Peter expounds his own Words of Humane Ordinance, to be the King, who is the Lex Loquens, a Speaking Law; he cannot mean that Kings themselves are an human Ordinance, since St. Paul calls the Supreme Power, The Ordinance of God; and the Wisdom of God saith, By me Kings Reign: But his meaning must be, that the Laws of Kings are Human Ordinances. Next, the Governours that are sent by him; that is by the King, not by God, as some corruptly would wrest the Text, to justifie Popular Governours as authorized by God, whereas in Gramatical Construction [Him] the Relative must be referred to the next Antecedent, which is King; Besides, the Antithesis between Supreme and Sent, proves plainly that the Governours were sent by Kings; for if the Governours were sent by God, and the King by an Humane Ordinance, then it follows, that the Governours were Supreme, and not the King; Or if it be said, that both King and Governours are sent by God, then they are both equal, and so neither of them Supreme. Therefore St. Peter's meaning is in short, obey the Laws of the King, or of his Ministers. By which it is evident, that neither St. Peter, nor S. Paul, intended other Form of Government than only Monarchical, much less any Subjection of Princes to Humane Laws.

That familiar distinction of the Schoolmen, whereby they Subject Kings to the Directive, but not to the Coactive Power of Laws, is a Confession that Kings are not bound by the Positive Laws of any Nation: Since the Compulsory Power of Laws is that which properly makes Laws to be Laws; by binding men by Rewards or Punishment to Obedience; whereas the Direction of the Law, is but like the advice and direction which the King's Council gives the King, which no man says is a Law to the King.

There want not those who Believe that the first invention of Laws was to Bridle and moderate the over great Power of Kings; but the truth is, the Original of Laws was for the keeping of the Multitude in Order: Popular Estates could not Subsist at all without Laws; whereas Kingdoms were Govern'd many Ages without them. The People of Athens, as soon as they gave over Kings, were forced to give Power to Draco, then to Solon, to make them Laws, not to bridle Kings, but themselves; and though many of their Laws were very Severe and Bloody, yet for the Reverence they bare to their Law-makers they willingly submitted to them. Nor did the People give any Limited Power to Solon, but an Absolute Jurisdiction, at his pleasure to Abrogate and Confirm what he thought fit; the People never challenging any such Power to themselves: So the People of Rome gave to the Ten Men, who were to chuse and correct their Laws for the Twelve Tables, and Absolute Power, without any Appeal to the people.

The reason why Laws have been also made by Kings, was this, when Kings were either busyed with Wars, or distracted with Publick Cares, so that every private man could not have accesse to their persons, to learn their Wills and Pleasure; then of necessity were Laws invented, that so every particular Subject might find his Prince's Pleasure decyphered unto him in the Tables of his Laws, that so there might be no need to resort to the King; but either for the Interpretation or Mitigation of Obscure or Rigorous Laws, or else in new Cafes, for a Supplement where the Law was Defective. By this means both King and People were in many things eased: First, The King by giving Laws doth free himself of great and intolereable Troubles, as Moses did himself by chusing Elders. Secondly, The people have the Law as a Familiar Admonisher and Interpreter of the King's pleasure, which being published throughout the Kingdom, doth represent the Presence and Majesty of the King: Also the Judges and Magistrates, (whose help in giving Judgment in many Causes Kings have need to use) are restrained by the Common Rules of the Law from using their own Liberty to the injury of others, since they are to judge according to the Laws, and not follow their own Opinions.

Now albeit Kings, who make the Laws, be (as King James teacheth us) above the Laws; yet will they Rule their Subjects by the Law; and a King, governing in a setled Kingdom, leaves to be a King, and degenerates into a Tyrant, so soon as he seems to Rule according to his Laws; yet where he sees the Laws Rigorous or Doubtful, he may mitigate and interpret. General Laws made in Parliament, may, upon known Respects to the King, by his Authority be Mitigated or suspended, upon Causes only known to him. And although a King do frame all his Actions to be according to the Laws, yet he is not bound thereto, but at his good Will, and for good Example: Or so far forth as the General Law of the Safety of the Common-Weale doth naturally bind him; for in such sort only Positive Laws may be said to bind the King, not by being Positive, but as they are naturally the Best or Only Means for the Preservation of the Common-Wealth. By this means are all Kings, even Tyrants and Conquerors, bound to preserve the Lands, Goods, Liberties, and Lives of all their Subjects, not by any Municipial Law of the Land, so much as the Natural Law of a Father, which binds them to ratifie the Acts of their Fore-Fathers and Predecessors, in things necessary for the Publick Good of their Subjects.

Others there be that affirm, That although Laws of themselves do not bind Kings yet the Oaths of Kings at their Coronations tye them to keep all the Laws of their Kingdoms. How far this is true, let us but examine the Oath of the Kings of England at their Coronation; the words whereof are these, Art thou pleased to cause to be administered in all thy Judgements indifferent and upright Justice, and to use Discretion with Mercy and Verity? Art thou pleased that our upright Laws and Customs be observed, and dost thou promise that those shall be protected and maintained by thee? These two are the Articles of the King's Oath, which concern the Laity or Subjects in General; to which the King answers affirmatively. Being first demanded by the Arch-bishop of Canterbury, Pleaseth it you to confirm and observe the Laws and Customs of Ancient Times, [granted from God] by just and devout Kings, unto the English Nation, by Oath unto the said People. Especially the Laws, Liberties, and Customs granted unto the Clergy and Laity by the famous King Edward. We may observe, in these words of the Articles of the Oath, that the King is required to observe not all the Laws, but only the Upright, and that the Discretion and Mercy. The Word Upright cannot mean all Laws, because in the Oath of Richard the Second, I find Evil and Unjust Laws mentioned, which the King swears to abolish; and in the Old Abridgment of Statutes, set forth in Henry the Eighth's days, the King is to swear wholly to put out Evil Laws; which he cannot do, if he be bound to all Laws. Now what Laws are Upright and what Evil, who shall judge but the King, since he swears to administer Upright Justice with Discretion and Mercy (or as Bracton hath it) aquitatem praecipiat, & misericordiam. So that in effect, the King doth swear to keep no Laws, but such as in His Judgment are Upright, and those not literally always, but according to Equity of his Conscience, join'd with Mercy, which is properly the Office of a Chancellour rather than of a Judge; and if a King did strictly swear to observe all the Laws, he could not without Perjury give his Consent to the Repealing or Abrogating of any Statute by Act of Parliament, which would be very mischievable to the State.

But let it be supposed for truth, that Kings do swear to observe all the Laws of their Kingdoms, yet no man can think it reason that Kings should be more bound by their Voluntary Oaths than Common Persons are by theirs. Now if a private person make a Contract either with Oath or without Oath, he is no further bound than the Equity and Justice of the Contract ties him; for a man may have Relief against an unreasonable and unjust promise, if either Deceit, or Errour, or Force, or Fear induced him thereunto: Or if it be hurtful or grievous in the performance. Since the Laws in many Cafes give the King a Prerogative above Common Persons, I see no Reason why he should be denyed the Priviledge which the meanest of his Subjects doth enjoy.

Here is a fit place to examine a Question which some have moved, Whether it be a sin for a Subject to disobey the King, if he Command any thing contrary to his Laws? For satisfaction in this point, we must resolve, that not only in Human Laws, but even in Divine, a thing may be commanded contrary to Law, and yet Obedience to such a Command is necessary. The sanctifying of the Sabbath is a Divine Law; yet if a Master Command his Servant not to go to Church upon a Sabbath-day, the Best Divines teach us, That the Servant must obey this Command, though it may be Sinful and Unlawful in the Master; because the Servant hath no Authority or Liberty to Examine and Judge whether his Master Sin or no in so Commanding; for there may be a just Cause for a Master to keep his Servant from Church, as appears Luke 14.5 yet it is not fit to tye the Master to acquaint his Servant with his Secret Counsels, or present Necessity: And in such Cafes, the Servants not going to Church, becomes the Sin of the Master, and not of the Servant. The like may be said of the King's Commanding a man to serve him in the Wars, he may not Examine whether the War be Just or Unjust, but must Obey, since he hath no Commission to Judge of the Titles of Kingdoms, or Causes of War; nor hath any Subject Power to Condemn his King for breach of his own Laws.

Many will be ready to say, It is a Slavish and Dangerous Condition to be subject to the Will of any One Man, who is not subject to the Laws. But such men consider not, 1. That the Prerogative of a King is to be above all Laws, for the good only of them that are under the Laws, and to defend the Peoples Liberties, as His Majesty graciously affirmed in His Speech after His last Answer to the Petition of Right: Howsoever some are afraid of the Name of Prerogative, yet they may assure themselves, the Case of Subjects would be desperately miserable without it. The Court of Chancery it self is but a Branch of the Kings Prerogative, to Relieve men against the inexorable rigour of the Law, which without it is no better than a Tyrant, since Summum Fus, is Summa Injuria. General Pardons, at the Coronation and in Parliaments, are but the Bounty of the Prerogative. 2. There can be no Laws without a Supreme Power to command or make them. In all Artistocraties the Nobles are above the Laws, and in all Democraties the People. By the like Reason, in a Monarchy the King must of necessity be above the Laws; there can be no Soveraign Majesty in him that is under them; that which giveth the very Being to a King is the Power to give Laws; without this Power He is but an Equivocal King. It skills not which way Kings come by their Power, whether by Election, Donation, Succession, or by any other means; for it is still the manner of the Government by Supreme Power that makes them properly Kings, and not the means of obtaining their Crowns. Neither doth the Diversity of Laws, nor contrary Customs, whereby each Kingdom differs from another, make the Forms of Common-Weal different, unless the Power of making Laws be in several Subjects.

For the Confirmation of this point, Aristotle saith, That a perfect Kingdom is that wherein the King rules all things according to his Own Will, for he that is called a King according to the Law, makes no kind of Kingdom at all. This it seems also the Romans well understood to be most necessary in a Monarchy; for though they were a People most greedy of Liberty, yet the Senate did free Augustus from all Necessity of Laws, that he might be free of his own Authority, an of absolute Power over himself and over the Laws, to do what he pleased, and leave undone what he list, and this Decree was made while Augustus was yet absent. Accordingly we find, that Ulpian the great Lawyer delivers it for a Rule of the Civil Law; Princeps, Legibus solutus est, The Prince is not bound by the Laws.

If the Nature of Laws be advisedly weighed, the Necessity of the Princes being above them may more manifest it self; we all know that a Law in General is the command of a Superior Power. Laws are divided (as Bellermine divides the Word of God) into written and unwritten, not for that it is not Written at all, but because it was not Written by the first Devisers or Makers of it. The Common Law (as the Lord Chancellor Egerton teacheth us) is the Common Custom of the Realm. Now concerning Customs, this must be considered, that for every Custom there was a time when it was not Custom; and the first President we now have, had no President when it began; when every Custom began, there was something else than Custom that made it lawful, or else the beginning. And the first Power which we find (as it is confessed by all men) is the Kingly Power, which was both in this and in all other Nations of the World, long before any Laws, or any other kind of Government was thought of; from whence we must necessarily infer, that the Common Law it self, or Common Customs of this Land, were Originally the Laws and Commands of Kings at first unwritten.